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3.2  Concluding Observations 
The Echeverria economic program was a clear failure. For a couple of  years 
following the 1971 recession, output grew strongly. The 1972-74 expansion was 
necessarily temporary, however, given the  fundamental economic imbalances 
created  by  large  fiscal  deficits  and  mismanaged  monetary  policy.  In  the 
administration’s last two years, output and employment growth slowed consid- 
erably while inflationary and balance of payments pressures became extreme. 
Distributional considerations do not  alter this  assessment.  None  of  the 
studies discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  turn  up  any  evidence  that  the 
overall disthbution of  income improved.’  Nor  does a less formal examina- 
tion of  Echeverria’s policies suggest that they benefitted either the urban or 
rural poor. The real blue-collar manufacturing wage grew at a slower pace 
than  during  Stabilizing  Development.  Public  investment  in  agriculture 
increased initially but was later severely reduced when budgetary problems 
became acute in  1975 and  1976. Overall, the agricultural sector stagnated, 
experiencing average annual growth of  only 2.6 percent. 
The Echevem’a  administration failed politically as well as economically. 
The crisis of  political legitimacy that  came to the fore in  1968 was never 
squarely faced. Echeverria made no progress toward reconstructing a stable 
political consensus and, at the very end of his term, in an effort to revalidate 
his  tarnished  populist  credentials,  he  introduced  new  political  tensions 
through a heavy-handed land expropriation in the northwest. Once again, the 
political elites could not  reach agreement on a presidential successor, and 
Echevem’a  had  to  choose  his  successor unilaterally, just  as  he  had  been 
chosen unilaterally six years earlier by  Diaz Ordaz. 
4  The Lopez Portillo 
Administration 
The Lopez Portillo administration began under difficult circumstances. In the 
last three years of the Echevem’a  administration, the economy’s performance 
had  deteriorated steadily.  Real GDP growth fell for the third  consecutive 
year in  1976, dropping to 4.2 percent,  while the inflation rate rose to the 
relatively high level of 27 percent. Despite widespread imposition of import 
controls,  the  current account registered a  deficit of  $3.68  billion,  and  in 
October, after having been pegged at  12.5 pesos per dollar for twenty-two 
years, the currency was devalued to 23 pesos per dollar. The overall fiscal 429  Mexico/Chapter 4 
deficit increased slightly from the previous year and, at 9.9 percent of GDP, 
was obviously unsustainable. 
Shortly after the October devaluation, a Letter of  Intent was submitted to 
the IMF outlining a stabilization program to be implemented in stages over 
the next three years. Table 4.1 lists the main targets of the Fund program. 
The  program  called  for  the  standard  mixture  of  trade  liberalization  and 
economic austerity. Public  sector  savings,  international reserves,  and  net 
domestic assets of the Central Bank were to increase, and a $3 billion limit 
was  imposed  on additional foreign borrowing by  the public  sector. Wage 
restraint  was  to  accompany  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint:  annual  wage 
increases  of  10  percent,  12  percent,  and  15  percent  were  planned  for 
1977-79.'  The trade reforms were aimed at increasing the openness of  the 
economy and rationalizing the system of incentives for exporting and import 
substitution. Import  licenses were  to  be  progressively replaced by  tariffs 
granting, in most cases, a lesser degree of  protection.2 
Table 4.1  Macroeconomic Targets for IMF Stabilization Program of September 1976 
(% of  GDP) 
1976 Projection  1977  1978  1979 
Balance of  payments 
-  1  .o  .5  Change in international reserves  - 
Merchandise trade and services balance  -2.3  -  .5  .1 
Interest payments on the external debt  -1.7  -2.1  -2.2  -2.2 
Transfers and other factor payments  -  .9  -1.0  -1.0  -1.0 
Change in net indebtedness of  the public sector  5.7  3.0  2.0  1.0 
- 
Direct investment  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.6 
Public sector operations 
Revenues 
Current expenditures 
Public sector savings 
Investment 
Deficit 
Net external financing 
Net domestic financing 
Investment 
Savings and investment 
Gross fixed investment of  the public sector 
Gross fixed investment of the private sector 






Accumulation of  international reserves 


















27.7  28.8  30.0 
25.4  24.8  24.5 
2.3  4.0  5.5 
8.3  8.0  8.0 
-6.0  -4.0  -2.5 
3.0  2.0  1  .o 
3.0  2.0  I .5 
26.0  27.0  28.0 
8.3  8.0  8.0 
15.7  17.0  18.0 
2.0  2.0  2.0 
27.0  27.5  28.0 
22.4  23.9  25.4 
2.3  4.0  5.5 
20. I  19.9  19.9 
4.6  3.6  2.6 
1 .o  .5  0 
Source:  Economic Memorandum, Government of  Mexico (13 September 1976) 430  Edward F.  Buffie 
This stabilization program was fairly successful in its first year. Although 
the  revenue  share  of  the  public  sector  increased  only  slightly,  the 
consolidated fiscal deficit was still lowered from 9.9 to 6.7 percent of GDP 
through a sharp reduction in investment spending. Cutbacks in the parastatal 
sector accounted for a large fraction of  the decrease in total real investment 
spending-nominal  non-PEMEX parastatal investment expenditures actually 
declined by  1.11 billion pesos. 
Wage  restraint and  the  reduction  in  public  sector absorption exerted  a 
favorable impact upon the price level and the payments balance. The inflation 
rate  declined from  27.2 to  20.7  percent (December-to-December change), 
while the current account deficit fell by over $2 billion in response to sharp 
increases in real export and import prices. The improvement in the current 
account was matched by a similarly large improvement in the capital account 
as capital flight decreased following the stiff devaluation of the currency in the 
last quarter of  1976. The lower current and private sector capital account 
deficits  together  with  an  additional  $2.7  billion  of  public  sector  foreign 
borrowing enabled Central Bank reserves to increase by  $657 million after 
declining by over $1 billion the previous year. 
A certain measure of success was also achieved with respect to the targets 
for real  economic  activity.  The  economy  went  into  a  recession,  but  the 
general downturn was less severe than anticipated: real GDP, which had been 
forecasted to remain constant, grew 3.4 percent. 
The one area in which the economy’s performance was unsatisfactory was 
private sector investment spending. After registering modest growth in the 
preceding  two  years,  real  fixed  capital  formation  in  the  private  sector 
declined  6.7  percent  in  1977.3 This  sharp  contraction  was  apparently 
induced by  the series of currency devaluations starting in the last quarter of 
1976, which strongly increased the real price of  imported capital goods and 
diminished the profitability of new investment. In the face of a 19.4 percent 
increase in real import prices, the volume of  capital good imports fell 27.6 
percent in 1977.4 
Exactly how the economy would have evolved in the last two years of  the 
stabilization program must be left open to conjecture, for in the course of the 
year, policy perspectives changed radically as it became widely known that 
Mexico’s oil wealth was far greater than formerly thought. The 1975 figure 
for proven hydrocarbon reserves of 6.4 billion barrels was increased to 11.2 
billion during 1976 and then raised further to 16 billion at the end of  1977 
(Zedillo  1985,  304).5 This  constituted  a  stupendous increase  in  national 
wealth; by the time oil prices reached $31.25 per barrel in  1980, oil wealth 
would measure  1,370 percent of  GNP and 570 percent of  the value of  the 
aggregate capital stock (Rizzo 1984, 109). 
An  immediate consequence of  the discovery of  enormous oil wealth was 
the virtual disappearance of  any constraints on  foreign borrowing.  Fierce 431  Mexico/Chapter 4 
competition arose among foreign banks  to  extend  new  loans  to Mexico. 
Naturally, the  Mexican government took advantage of  its enhanced credit 
rating to improve the terms of  its foreign debt. During 1978 and  1979, the 
average maturity on public sector debt was lengthened from a little less than 
five years to over eight years. In addition, the interest spread over LIBOR 
(London  interbank  offer  rate  for  dollar  deposits) was  reduced  from  an 
average (for long-term credits) of  1.625 percentage points in the preceding 
three-year period to between 0.625 and 0.825 percentage points, a rate that 
compared favorably with  that  charged  to  prime  customers in  the  OECD 
countries (Zedillo 1985, 308). 
A second and more important repercussion of oil wealth came in the policy 
sphere. Not surprisingly, Mexican officials felt that they now faced a less rigid 
set of constraints and that economic policy  ought to be  reoriented toward 
recovering the development momentum lost in preceding years. The Fund 
program, therefore, was dropped in favor of  a “new,”  more expansionary 
policy package. 
4.1  1978-81:  Public-Expenditure-Led Growth Once Again 
The new  development plan called for large,  sustained increases in real 
government expenditures. In this respect, the plan appeared to continue the 
discredited public-expenditure-led-growth (PEW) strategy of the Echevema 
administration. It was argued, however, that an economic base expanded ant 
strengthened by oil wealth could support a much enlarged role for the public 
sector.  Furthermore, strong  fiscal  stimulus was  to be  only  one part  of  a 
comprehensive reform package that would avoid the main policy errors of 
the  Echevema  administration. The  liberal wage  increases  granted  in  the 
early and mid-seventies were discontinued and replaced by  a quite restrictive 
wage policy: even though the 1977 inflation rate was 20.7 percent, the wage 
increase announced for government employees was only 10 percent in  1978 
and the contractual “guideline”  for private sector wage increases was set at 
12 percent. The exchange rate was to be managed more flexibly in order to 
avoid  balance  of  payments  crises  and  speculative runs  against the  peso. 
Nominal interest rates would also be more flexible and were to be set so as to 
maintain  positive  real  interest  rates  and  a  high  level  of  financial 
intermediation. To  keep  the  fiscal deficit in  check,  the  operations of  the 
public enterprises would be rationalized and tax revenues would be increased 
by  broadening the tax base and improving tax administration and taxpayer 
compliance. At the same time that the size of  the fiscal deficit would  be 
diminished by  these measures,  new  debt instruments (government bonds 
known as CETES) would be introduced to reduce monetization of the deficit. 
Finally,  public  sector  expansion  was  not  to  occur  at  the  expense  of 
productive capacity in the private sector. Capital goods were exempted from 432  Edward F.  Buffie 
the value-added tax  (VAT), and a more favorable treatment of  depreciation 
allowances was introduced in an effort to revive private investment. 
It  is  undeniable  that  between  1978  and  1981 the  Mexican  economy 
recorded  some  impressive accomplishments (tables 4.2a  and  4.2b).  Real 
GDP growth ranged between 8.0 and 9.1 percent, and employment growth 
in the high-wage manufacturing sector and the public sector increased 27.2 
and  41.4 percent,  respectively. Both  private and public  sector investment 
spending increased rapidly. The share of  public sector investment in  GDP 
rose (at 1970 prices) from 7.2 to 10.8 percent and that of the private sector 
increased  from  11.7 to  14.1  percent.  The  inflation  rate  began  creeping 
upward after 1978, but never exceeded 30 percent. 
For  1978 and  perhaps part  of  1979, it  can be  argued  that  the demand 
stimulus  provided  by  higher  public  sector  spending  was  an  important 
element  in  the  economic  recovery.  The  source  of  rapid  growth  beyond 
early  1979,  however,  seems  to  have  been  strong  supply-side expansion 
fueled  by  sharp  decreases  in  the  real  prices  of  domestic  and  imported 
intermediate inputs  (table 4.3).  Price  controls  kept  the  internal price  of 
energy growing at  a pace barely  one-third that  of  the GDP deflator. The 
relative price of  imported intermediates also fell considerably as the “fixed 
but adjustable exchange rate”  proved to be more fixed than adjustable. The 
nominal  exchange rate  rose  at  an  annual average rate  of  3.6 percent,  far 
less  than  the  spread  between  the  U.S.  and  Mexican  inflation  rates. 
Consequently, the real exchange rate declined by  a full 30 percent between 
1977  and  1981,  provoking  a  128  percent  increase  in  the  volume  of 
imported  intermediate  inputs.  Since  factors  are  normally  gross  comple- 
ments  (a decrease in  the price  of  one  input  raises  the  demand for  other 
inputs),  the  large decreases in  intermediates prices would  be  expected to 
raise  strongly  the  demand  for  labor  and  capital,  stimulating  growth  in 
employment  and  investment.  The  elastic  supply  response  also  helps  to 
explain why the huge growth in government spending did not prove highly 
inflationary until the 1982 crisis.6 
Table 4.2a  Macroeconomic Aggregates (% change)” 
1976  1977  I978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Real GDP 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
hflationb 
Manufacturing sector employment‘ 
General government employment 




4.2  3.4  8.3  9.1  8.3  8.0  -.5 
5.0  3.6  9.8  10.6  7.2  7.0  -2.9 
1.0  7.5  6.0  -2.1  7.1  6.1  -.6 
27.2  20.7  16.2  20.0  29.8  28.7  98.9 
-.06  1.9  7.9  6.7  7.2  2.9  -8.5 
9.8  5.7  7.5  9.9  10.8  9.6  5.3 
9.1  5.5  7.3  9.2  10.4  9.3  5.9 
.4  -6.7  15.2  20.2  14.9  14.7  -15.9 
6.1  -6.7  5.1  22.7  13.7  14.0  -17.3 
-7.6  -6.7  31.6  17.1  16.7  15.8  -14.2 433  MexicoKhapter 4 
Table 4.2b  Composition of  Output (% of GDP)~ 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Private 
Public 
Change in inventories 
Exports 
Imports 
69.9  69.0  68.9  68.7  68.2  67.9  69.0 
9.0  8.6  8.8  8.8  8.9  9.1  9.3 
20.9  18.9  20.0  22.1  23.5  24.9  21.0 
12.9  11.7  11.3  12.7  13.4  14.1  11.7 
8.0  7.2  8.7  9.4  10.1  10.8  9.3 
2.3  3.5  3.0  2.8  4.6  5.1  .5 
7.9  8.8  9.1  9.3  9.1  9.0  10.2 
10.1  8.8  9.9  11.7  14.3  15.9  10.1 
Sources:  National Income Accounts, Production Accounts of  the Public Sector, 1975- 1983 (Mexico, D.F.: 
INEGI) for government employment data. The manufacturing sector employment series is from Indicudores 
Economicos (Bank  of Mexico). All other data is from the National Income Accounts (INEGI). 
”Real variables are expressed in  terms of  1970 prices 
”December-to-December change in the CPI. 
‘December-to-December change. 
dOutput shares at 1970 prices. 
Table 4.3  Real Prices of  Intermediate Inputs (1977  = 100) 
1971  1978  1979  1980  1981 
Real exchange ratea  100  93.2  86.2  16.4  70.0 
Real domestic price of energy inputsb  100  89.8  80.6  68.6  63.2 
Source:  The internal producer price index for energy inputs is from the series “Combustible  y Energia”  in 
table 20.8, Esradisticas de Mkxico (Mexico, D.F.: INEGI, 1985): 753-57. 
“Calculated as the period average official exchange rate multiplied by  the ratio of  the US.  wholesale price 
index (now called the producer price index) to the Mexican GDP deflator. 
bDeflated by the GDP deflator. 
While the overall performance of  the Mexican economy was impressive 
during 1978-81,  there is considerable disagreement about the extent to which 
labor benefitted from this phase of historically high growth. Employment in 
the high-wage public and the manufacturing sectors increased considerably, 
and though reliable employment data does not exist for other sectors of  the 
economy, it appears that the growth in aggregate labor demand was healthy as 
well.  According to  some  accounts,  labor shortages even began  to  appear 
toward the end of  1981 (Zedillo 1985, 305; Gregory 1986, 303). 
But if  labor gained from better employment opportunities, the limited data 
available also suggests that real wage compression accompanied employment 
growth during this period. Various real wage indices are computed in table 
4.4. Between 1977 and 1981, the average real minimum wage decreased 10.6 
percent and the real public sector wage grew by only 4.4 percent. Of course, 
the information conveyed by  these two wage indices is limited. Neither the 
minimum wage nor the government sector wage is necessarily an accurate 
index of private sector wage costs. This would seem to be especially true of 
the  late  seventies.  Unions  strongly  resisted  government  wage  guidelines 
implying real wage cuts, and to avoid or settle strikes many firms agreed to 434  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 4.4  Real Wages (1977  = 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
CPI deflator 
Average minimum wageb 




Overall wage (inclusive of fringe benefits) 
Tornell contract wage 
Average minimum wage 




Overall wage (inclusive of  fringe benefits) 








































































Sources: Minimum wage data are from INEGI. The blue-collar, white-collar, and overall wage series for the 
manufacturing sector  are from Encuesfa Industrid  Mensual.  as reported in  Indices  de Precios  (February 
1986). The Tornell contract wage is based on the contract wage series found in Tornell (1983). 
“The minimum wage index is a weighted average of  minimum wages in different regions, where the weights 
are given by the region’s share of  the total salaried population in the nation. In years in which there is more 
than one wage adjustment, the period average figure is generated by weighting the wage in each subperiod by 
the fraction of  the year during which it prevailed. 
bPeriod average nominal wage deflated by  either the period average CPI or the GDP dellator. 
‘End-of-year wage deflated by the end-of-year CPI. 
dAverage of  the beginning- and end-of-year wage deflated by the GDP dellator. 
grant wage increases well in excess of the guidelines. Also, a shift toward 
greater fringe benefits (social security, vacation pay, year-end bonuses, and 
employer-subsidized housing, food, and transportation) pushed up labor costs 
more than is suggested by nominal wage settlements. 
Fortunately, for the manufacturing sector at least, a good deal is known 
about the nature of wage contracts during this period. The first three indices 
in  table 4.4  were  constructed using  the  data gathered from the  Bank of 
Mexico’s survey of  contractual wages  in  large manufacturing firms.  The 
rows labeled “Tornell contract wage” are based on wage series computed in 
a careful study by Tornell (1983). Tornell used data from actual contracts to 
adjust nominal wages for all fringe benefits. A monthly manufacturing sector 
wage series was then constructed by weighting the wage in each contract by 
the fraction of  the total labor force in the sample covered by  that particular 
contract. The sample consisted of  data from forty-one firms that produced 
more than half of total manufacturing sector output.’ 
The  contractual wage  series confirm  the  general  picture  of  real  wage 
restraint in the formal sectors of the economy. Regardless of whether the CPI 
or the GDP deflator is used, the real contract wage declined over 1977-81, 
though none of the indices decreased as much as the real minimum wage. 435  Mexico/Chapter 4 
Despite real wage restraint and  a substantial increase in  the economy's 
investment rate, the acceleration in growth after the 1977 recession was not 
sustainable. In retrospect, it is clear that little, if  any, policy reform took 
place and that the oil bonanza simply resulted in the policy mistakes of  the 
Echevem'a  administration being repeated on a larger scale. Both current and 
capital expenditures of  the public sector grew more rapidly than projected 
and got completely out of hand after 1980 (table 4.5). Total real public sector 
expenditure increased by  97.7 percent in the space of four years (calculated 
by deflating by the period average CPI), climbing from 29.5 percent of GDP 
in  1977 to 41.3 percent in  1981, a figure some nine percentage points above 
the peak value recorded during the Echeverria administration. This massive 
increase in expenditure led to large fiscal deficits as it was not matched by a 
similar buildup in revenues. After declining to 6.7 percent of GNP in  1977, 
the consolidated public sector deficit grew steadily and  then skyrocketed to 
14.7 percent  of  GNP in  1981 when  real  public  sector  spending  (net  of 
interest payments on the foreign debt) rose an astounding 28.6 percent. 
The breakdown in the overall deficit is shown in  table 4.6 and points to 
stagnation of nonoil revenues, in addition to rapid expenditure growth, as an 
important factor in the rising deficits. PEMEX initially registered a small 
surplus, but  after  1978, when  petroleum exports  commenced on  a  large 
scale, the surplus rose rapidly, reaching 6.3 percent of  GDP in 1980 and then 
falling back to 4.1 percent in 1981. This sizable revenue windfall was offset 
to  a large extent by  slow revenue growth elsewhere in the public  sector. 
Between  1978 and  1981, the deficit of  the non-PEMEX parastatal sector 
increased from 2.8 percent of GDP to 5.1 percent, with more than half of the 
increment owing to the decline in the sector's revenue share. The 1979 tax 
reform improved the efficiency and equity of  the tax  system, but did not 
succeed  in  increasing  revenues  significantly:8 the  revenue  share  of  the 
nonparastatal  sector declined to  an  even  greater extent than  that  of  the 
(non-PEMEX) parastatal sector, dropping from 10.5 percent of GDP in 1978 
Table 4.5  Public Seetor Expenditures and Revenues (9% of GDP) 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Expenditure 
Current 





Deficit on financial intermediation" 
Monetary deficit 
29.5  31.0  32.2  34.6  41.3  46.4 
22.0  22.3  22.6  24.9  28.0  36.0 
1.9  2.0  2.1  2.  I  2.3  5.1 
20.1  20.3  20.5  22.8  25.7  30.7 
7.5  8.7  9.6  9.7  13.3  10.6 
24.2  25.5  26.2  27.8  27.7  30.1 
5.4  5.5  6.0  6.8  13.6  16.3 
1.4  1.2  1.4  1 .o  1.2  1.4 
6.7  6.7  7.4  7.9  14.7  17.6 
~~ 
Source: Estadisricas Hacendarias del Sector Publico: Cifras Anuales, 1965- 1982  (SHCP). 
'Deficit of  La Banca de Desarrollo. 436  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 4.6  Breakdown of the Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) 
































































5.8  1.5 
2.9  3.6 
3.0  3.9 
12.  I  11.6 
-6.3  -4.1 
12.0  13.0 
9.0  9.9 
3.1  3.1 
8.2  7.9 
3.9  5. I 
16.7  20.8 
13.0  14.5 
3.7  6.3 
7.5  8.3 
















Source: Estadisticus Hucendurius del Sector Publico: Cfrus Anuules, 1965-1982  (SHCP). 
“Gusto de operucion plus ajenas de gasto (operating expenditure plus “outside  account”  expenditure). 
bPhysical investment only (excludes financial investment). 
‘The  sum of  current income, capital income, taxes paid, and ujenas de ingreso (outside account income). 
dIncludes DDF (Department of  the Federal Disbict). 
to 8.3 percent in 1981. Moreover, part of current expenditures of the federal 
government probably reflects expenditures induced by revenue shortfalls in 
the  nonparastatal  sector.  In  the  detailed  fiscal  accounts  of  Secretaria de 
Hacienda y Credito Publico (SHCP), it is not possible to trace the majority 
of  transfer payments made by  the federal government. These unaccounted 
for transfers are quite sizable and reflect mostly expenditures to cover the 
losses of  various price support schemes, local “development institutions,” 
and firms in which the government has a minority interest (but which are not 
classified  as  state-owned enterprises).’  Such  transfer  payments  increased 
steadily throughout the Lopez Portillo senenio and exceeded in each year the 
deficit of  the non-PEMEX parastatal sector (table 4.7). If  the unaccounted 
for transfer payments in the table are treated as a negative revenue item (i.e., 
“induced”  subsidies), the revenue share in GDP of the non-PEMEX public 
Table 4.7  Hidden Transfer Payments (% of  GDP) 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Unaccounted for federal government transfers  3.6  3.4  3.9  4.6  5.7  8.4 
Source: Estadisticus Hucendarius del  Sector Publico: Cifras Anuales, 1965-1982,  p.  22 (SHCP).  Sum of 
unaccounted for current and capital transfers. 437  MexicolChapter 4 
sector fell by 5.8 percentage points over 1978- 8 1, indicating, remarkably, a 
three-percentage-point decrease in the sum of  non-PEMEX revenues and the 
PEMEX surplus. 
There can be  little doubt that the large decrease in the share of  nonoil 
revenues was due principally to a reluctance to raise public sector prices. 
Some evidence in support of  this claim is presented in table 4.8.  After 1977 
the pace of public sector price increases was less than half that of the inflation 
rate,  and sales of  goods and services by  the non-PEMEX parastatal sector 
declined relative to GNP. The share of  general tax revenues in GDP, on the 
other hand, exhibited a modest rise before dropping sharply in  1982.” 
The  failure  to  maintain  real  public  sector  prices  not  only  slowed  the 
growth of non-PEMEX revenues but also greatly diminished the size of  the 
PEMEX  surplus.  Domestic  energy  prices  changed  very  little  as  world 
petroleum prices shot upward after 1973, so that by  1980 the average internal 
price of  petroleum products was less than one-quarter of  the world market 
price (table 4.9). If  the share of private sector investment and consumption 
in GDP is taken as a rough approximation of  the private sector share in total 
energy consumption, the revenue loss from the implicit subsidy on domestic 
consumption of PEMEX products amounted to 6.2 percent of  GDP in 1980, 
a figure almost as large as the entire public sector economic deficit that year. 
As  occurred  earlier  in  the  Echevem’a  administration,  the  large  fiscal 
deficits gave rise to unsustainably large balance of  payments deficits which 
ultimately proved  to  be  the  undoing  of  the  PELG  strategy. Consider the 
familiar decomposition of the current account deficit B: 
B =  (S  -I) +  (R -  G), 
where S is private sector savings, I is private sector investment, and R and G 
are total public sector revenues and expenditures (i.e., including those of the 
parastatal sector). Strictly speaking, it is improper to make conjectures about 
Table 4.8  Public Sector Prices and Revenues 
1977  1978  1979  1980  I981  1982 
Percentage increase in public sector pricesa  28.4  6.4  8.3  -  24.7  72.4 
Period average inflation rate  28.9  17.5  18.2  26.3  28.0  58.9 
Revenues from non-PEMEX parastatal sales  6.3  6.5  6.1  5.5  5.3  5.3 
General tax revenues (% of GDP)C  10.5  10.7  10.9  11.2  10.8  9.0 
of  goods and services (% of GDP)b 
Sources: Estadisticas Hacendarias del Sector Publico: Cijias Anuales, 1965- 1982 (SHCP) for non-PEMEX 
revenues from sales of  goods and services. Clavijo (1980) for public sector price increases between 1977 and 
1979. Indicadores Econornicos  (Bank of  Mexico) for public sector price increases between I980 and 1982. 
a Period average increases. There is a series break in  1980. 
Budget- and nonbudget-coneolled parastatal firms. 
Sum of  direct taxes, taxes on production and services, value-added taxes, and “other”  tax  revenues. Does 
not include gas taxes (which I classify as part of  PEMEX revenues). 438  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 4.9  Subsidy on Domestic Energy Consumption 
International Price/  Domestic Subsidy  Gross Subsidy 
Year  Domestic Pricea  (billion pesos)  (% of  GNP)  Net Subsidyb 
1973  1.29  5.4  .8  .7 
1974  2.30  39.9  4.4  3.6 
1975  1.90  30.0  2.7  2.0 
1976  2.90  74.3  5.4  4.4 
1977  3.17  114.7  6.2  4.9 
1978  3.49  147.0  6.3  4.9 
1979  4.06  228.1  7.4  5.8 
1980  4.68  350.9  8.2  6.2 
Source:  The relative domestic price of  PEMEX products and the implicit cost of  the domestic subsidy are 
from Rizzo (1984). 
aAverage international price of  PEMEX products relative to the average domestic price. 
bNet subsidy is obtained by  multiplying the gross subsidy by  the share of  private sector consumption and 
investment in GNP at current prices. (The change in inventories is not included in private investment.) 
the impact of the fiscal deficit on B without specifying a full model that takes 
into account induced changes in S and I. Nonetheless, the general picture is 
clear  enough  in  the  Mexican  case.  Private  sector  investment  spending 
increased  from  11.6  to  14.0 percent  of  GDP  (at  current  prices)  over 
1978-81  in response to the tax breaks provided in the 1978 tax reform, the 
large decreases in the real prices of factors complementary to capital, and the 
fall in  the real exchange rate, which effectively subsidized the purchase of 
imported machinery. The shift in the distribution of income away from labor 
and agriculture led to an even larger increase in the private sector saving rate 
(the share of private consumption in GDP declined from 66 to 61 percent at 
current prices), but the greater surplus of private sector savings over private 
investment was  not  nearly  large enough to  compensate for  the  massive 
decrease in public sector savings. 
The trend toward rising current account deficits and external indebtedness 
is spelled out in greater detail in tables 4.10 and 4.11. Trade liberalization 
combined with  real  exchange rate  appreciation lowered  the  real  price of 
imports (deflating by  the GDP deflator) by  approximately 28 percent from 
1977 to 1981, provoking a stupendous, across-the-board  increase in demand. 
Between  1978 and  1980, real  imports of  capital goods and intermediate 
inputs  increased by  more  than  100 percent.  As  the  relaxation  of  quotas 
favored consumption goods more than other types of imports, the volume of 
imported consumer goods increased even more strongly, rising by  over 200 
percent in the same three-year period."  In  1981, fears about the  growing 
payments  deficit  resulted  in  the  reimposition  of  quotas on  many  items, 
particularly consumer and capital goods imports. Nevertheless, the overall 
import volume still rose 15.2 percent. 
On the export side, oil sales became very sizable after 1978. From 1978 to 
1981, dollar earnings generated by petroleum exports increased 682 percent. 
Overall export  earnings, however,  rose  at  a  considerably  slower rate  as 439  MexicoKhapter 4 
Table 4.10  External Accounts 
~~  ~~~~  ~ 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Current account deficit (billion $) 
Merchandise exports (billion $) 
Merchandise imports (billion $) 
Real exchange rate' 
Real price of  total  merchandise exportsb 
Real price of total merchandise importsb 
Volume of total  merchandise exports 
Nonoil manufactures 






Volume of total merchandise imports 










































































-  39.0 
-  36.2 
-46.3 
-42.1 
Source: National Income  Accounts (INEGI) for traded goods price indices and  the  indices of  import  and 
export volumes. Indicadores Economicos (Bank of Mexico) for the current account deficit and dollar value of 
imports and exports. 
"1970  =  100.  calculated as  the period average  official exchange rate  multiplied by the ratio  of  the  U.S. 
wholesale price index (now called the producer price index) to the Mexican GDP deflator. 
b1970 =  LOO;  deflated by  the GDP deflator. 
nonoil exports suffered from both an appreciating real exchange rate and the 
dismantling  of  the  CEDIS  system  of  subsidies.  After  jumping  to  a 
decade-level  high  in  1977,  the  real  price  of  manufactured  exports 
plummeted,  declining  more  than  40  percent  in  the  next  four  years. 
Predictably, the volume of manufactured exports slowed sharply in 1979 and 
then turned negative in  1980 and 1981.12 
The  financial  counterpart  to  the  large  current  account  deficits  was  a 
fast-growing level of external indebtedness. The total foreign debt increased 
almost threefold to  $81 billion at the end of  1981. This figure, however, 
considerably overstates the increase in net foreign debt. Table 4.12 gathers 
together  various  estimates  of  the  magnitude of  capital  flight  during  this 
period. The wide variation in the estimates arises from different data bases. l3 
According to the Cumby and Levich (1987) estimate (col.  l), capital flight 
siphoned off roughly 46 percent of the extra debt accumulated between 1977 
and  1981. A problem with their estimate is that the net inflow of external 
resources is calculated from World Bank data on the change in gross external 
indebtedness.  But  as  Zedillo  points  out  (1987,  175-76),  this  is  not  an 
accurate measure of  net new indebtedness because in certain years some of 
the  increment in the  reported  debt figures  simply reflects  more  extensive 
coverage by the government's  debt-reporting systems. Zedillo (col. 2) uses 
the Bank of Mexico's balance of payments data to measure the change in net 
indebtedness (a  much  more  accurate  measure),  but  also  makes  the  odd 
adjustment of  subtracting from  the  official  current  account  data  imputed 440  Edward F.  Buffie 
Table 4.11  Debt Burden Measures 
~~~~  ~ 
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Total debt (billion $) 
Total debt/GDP 
Public sector debt serviceb (billion $) 
% of  Merchandise exports 
% of  Current account income 
% of  GDP 
Total debt serviceC  (billion $) 
% of Merchandise exports 
% of Current account income 
96 of  GDP 
Total debt service #2‘  (billion $) 
% of  Merchandise exports 
% of Current account income 
% of GDPa 
Net debt‘  (billion $) 
Net debt service‘(biI1ion  $) 
% of Merchandise exports 
% of Current account income 
% of GDP” 
Net debt service #2g (billion $) 
% of Merchandise exports 
% of Current account income 


























































































































































Sources: Mexican Economic Outlook (CIEMEX-WHARTON) for data on the total debt and short-term public 
and private sector debt. All other data come from Indicadores Economicos (Bank of  Mexico). 
“GDP measured in dollars was calculated by dividing nominal GDP by the period average controlled exchange 
rate. There is no correction for deviations of  the actual exchange rate from the equilibrium exchange rate. 
bPuhlic sector interest payments and amortization of the medium- and long-term debt. 
‘Public  sector debt service plus private sector interest payments. 
dThe sum of  public and private sector interest payments, public sector amortization of  the short-, medium-, 
and long-term debt, and  amortization of the short-term private sector debt.  Amortization of  the short-term 
debt is assumed to equal the previous period’s short-term debt. 
‘Calculated  as the cumulated value of official current account deficits starting from 1951 
‘Calculated by  scaling total interest payments by the public and private sectors by the ratio of net debt to total 
debt. No attempt is made to adjust for the fact that the interest rate on private sector foreign assets differs from 
the rates charged for foreign loans to the public and private sectors. 
gCalculated as the sum of public sector amortization of the short-, medium-, and long-term debt, amortization 
of  the short-term  private sector  debt, and  net  interest payments.  Net  interest payments  are  total  interest 
payments by the public and private sectors scaled down by the ratio of net debt to total debt. Amortization of 
the short-term debt is assumed to equal the previous period’s short-term debt. 
interest payments in identified Mexican deposits abroad. (For some reason, 
reinvested interest income from foreign assets is not treated as capital flight.) 
In  the  third  column,  labeled  “Modified  Zedillo,”  I  remove  this  latter 
adjustment. This gives a figure for capital flight that is $3.9 billion less than 
that of  Cumby and Levich. Finally, in the fourth column, the previous three 
estimates are corrected using  Gulati’s estimates (1987, 73) of  net  capital 
flight effected through trade-invoice faking.  In  Mexico,  underinvoicing of 
imports  exceeded  underinvoicing of  exports  during  this  period,  so  that 
estimated  capital  flight  is  reduced.  The  Gulati  adjustment  suggests  that 441  Mexico/Chapter 4 



















































CLC  z*  me 
5.61  1.31  1.60 
1.17  -.52  .01 
1.52  p.62  .25 
3.72  -3.71  .86 
6.15  7.32  11.62 
6.60  7.59  8.39 
6.88  -2.41  -1.44 
-.66  -4.35  -3.01 
-  -.68  1.15 
24.77  11.37  22.69 
-  10.83  26.29 
~  ~ 
Sources: Cumby and Levich (1987, 58). Gulati (1987, 73), and Zedillo (1987, 177). 
aMorgan Guaranty definition of capital flight: the change in the foreign debt plus net foreign direct investment 
plus the current account surplus minus the change in  short-term foreign assets of  the banking system minus 
change in foreign exchange reserves. The Zedillo estimates also subtract the change in other official external 
assets. 
bEstimate obtained using Zedillo’s data and the official figures for the current account deficit. 
‘Cumby-Levich estimate with current account data adjusted by Gulati’s estimate of  net trade invoice faking. 
*Zedill0 estimate with current account data adjusted by Gulati’s estimate of  net trade invoice faking. 
‘Modified Zedillo estimate with current account data adjusted by Gulati’s estimate of net trade invoice faking. 
approximately one-third of  the increase in total gross debt may have ended 
up financing capital flight.  l4 
Nearly all of the new debt was contracted by the public sector; the private 
sector debt tripled during 1978-81,  but still stood at only $21.9 billion in 
1981. Most of the $53 billion of debt held by the public sector took the form 
of  medium-  or  long-term  commercial  loans  extended  to  different  SOEs 
(PEMEX alone had contracted $15.7 billion of  foreign debt by  1981), but 
the short-term debt also grew rapidly and by the end of  1981 accounted for 
20.3 percent of the total public sector debt. Since over half of private sector 
borrowing was short term, for the aggregate debt the corresponding figure is 
a much higher 27.7 percent. By contrast, just three years earlier the share of 
short-term debt stood at only 13.5 percent.15 
Despite the large windfall conferred by  oil discoveries and the high rates 
of  GNP growth achieved between  1978 and  1981, it seems safe to say that 
an increase of this magnitude in the foreign debt was excessive. The standard 
debt burden  measures may  be found in  table 4.11.  l6  The net debt service 
measures take  account of  the fact that  the private and public  sectors hold 
income-earning foreign assets as well as foreign debts. In these figures, the 
net  debt  is  calculated,  crudely,  as  the  cumulative  value  of  past  official 
current account deficits starting from 195  1. 442  Edward F. Buffie 
While all of the debt burden measures decreased sharply after 1980 when 
oil exports increased by  $6.5 billion, it is also evident that the heavy binge of 
short-term borrowing  in  the  immediately preceding years  had  placed  the 
country  in  a  financially  precarious position.  Even  in  1981,  debt  service 
inclusive of short-term amortization claimed nearly 80 percent of total current 
account income. If  short-term amortization is excluded (which gives a better 
sense of the medium-run debt service profile), the debt service burden was not 
particularly onerous in 1980 or 1981, judged by the usual standards. Observe, 
however, that just one year later and notwithstanding a 13 percent increase in 
the dollar value of oil exports, a much less sanguine picture emerges. In 1982, 
debt service exclusive of  short-term amortization absorbed 62.2 percent of 
total current account income and 10.6 percent of  GNP.”  The corresponding 
figures for net debt service are smaller but still quite large. 
Even though the burden of  debt service eased considerably in  1980, the 
large current account deficit in that year was a clear warning signal that some 
adjustment in economic policy was needed. For reasons that are difficult to 
fathom, the signal was ignored. Apparently still in the grip of  oil euphoria, 
the Lopez Portillo administration bulled ahead with yet more vigorous fiscal 
expansion,  faithfully  following  the  dictates  of  the  political  expenditure 
cycle.18 Although the budget approved by Congress called for an unchanged 
nominal fiscal deficit, in  practice no  serious attempt was made to achieve 
fiscal restraint. Just as Echevem’a  had done earlier, Lopez Portillo overrode 
the  congressional  budget  by  routinely  authorizing  ampliaciones  presu- 
puestales  (“out-of-budget”  expenditures).  Those  likely  to  object  to  such 
practices were simply excluded from policymaking circles: since early 1980, 
the  head  of  the  Central  Bank  had  not  been  invited  to  attend  economic 
meetings of the cabinet (Zedillo 1985, 312). 
In  mid-1981,  developments in  the  oil  market  forced  a  reevaluation of 
economic policy. The  1981 budget had  been predicated on the assumption 
that Mexico would be able to increase its oil exports by 75 percent at a price 
10 percent above that prevailing at the end of  1980 (Zedillo 1985, 313). By 
June it had become clear that additional oil sales could not be made without 
accepting a cut in price. As the perception spread that a devaluation of  the 
peso  was  on  the  horizon,  Mexdollar  accounts  swelled  and  capital  flight 
assumed tremendous proportions. 
Confronted with an impending financial crisis, the Lopez Portillo admin- 
istration exhibited massive inertia. The daily crawl of the peso continued at an 
annual rate  of  just  9  percent.  On  the  fiscal front,  an  across-the-board, 4 
percent cut in expenditures was announced, but the proposed cuts were with 
respect to the higher than budgeted levels of expenditures and, in any case, 
were not actually carried out. In fact, spending increased apace so that by the 
end of  the year the share of public expenditures (net of interest payments on 
the foreign debt) in GDP had increased by six percentage points and the deficit 
was more than double its originally projected value. 443  MexicoIChapter 4 
Foreign  lending  was  undoubtedly  an  important  permissive  factor  in 
allowing necessary  policy  reforms  to  be  postponed.  The  current  account 
deficit in 1981 reached the staggering figure of $12.5 billion, and capital flight 
was of the same magnitude if  not several billion dollars larger. To  stem the 
potentially large drain on reserves, the public sector contracted an additional 
$20.3 billion of foreign debt. The new debt was obtained at a stiff price and 
bought the government only a very short breathing spell. Short-term loans 
constituted almost half of the total, and the favorable interest rate spreads of 
earlier years disappeared. This is certainly one of the most puzzling episodes 
in  recent  Mexican  economic  history.  It  is  more  than  a  little  difficult to 
understand why commercial banks were willing to grant new loans of  this 
magnitude in the absence of  any evidence that the Lopez Portillo adminis- 
tration was committed to reversing the direction of economic policy.  l9 
4.2  The 1982 Crisis 
The inability to substantively alter the course of economic policy persisted 
through the first half  of  1982. In mid-February, the Economic Adjustment 
Program was  announced.  The program entailed an  immediate 40  percent 
devaluation of  the  peso  and  severe import restrictions,  and  called for  an 
immediate increase in public sector prices and a substantial curtailment in 
public  expenditures over  the  coming year.  A  number of  these  measures, 
however, were introduced only after a delay of  several months or were not 
implemented at all.  The first increases in controlled prices and the prices 
charged for public sector goods and services did not occur until early June. 
And  while certain  expenditure cuts  took  place,  a host  of  other measures 
strongly boosted public sector spending: the large currency devaluation of 
February  17 was followed three weeks later by  a compensating 30 percent 
wage  increase; in  many  sectors,  the pressure to  finish projects started  in 
earlier  years  overrode  the  intention  to  reduce  expenditures; to  aid  firms 
holding dollar debt, it was announced that the state would absorb 42 percent 
of the capital losses due to changes in the exchange rate (Villareal 1983); an 
emergency scheme involving fiscal relief  and outright subsidies was drawn 
up  to  support  “productive  firms”;  and  finally,  to  fortify  labor  demand, 
CEPROFIs (Fiscal Incentive Certificates) providing tax exemptions equalling 
15 percent of the monthly payroll were granted to firms that could prove they 
had maintained employment levels  .*O 
The  net  effect  of  these  conflicting  measures  was  further  fiscal  and 
monetary  expansion.  Real  public  sector  investment  spending  contracted 
sharply, but the various aforementioned subsidy schemes apparently induced 
a large increase in current expenditure. (Unaccounted for federal government 
transfers jumped  to  8.4 percent of  GNP.) Higher  interest charges on  the 
public sector foreign debt were an important but secondary factor in the loss 
of  fiscal control. Net  of  interest payments on the foreign debt, real current 444  Edward F.  Buffie 
expenditure increased by  20.5  percent and total public sector spending by 
6.9 percent (calculated by deflating by  the period average CPI). As a result, 
despite a 37.6 percent increase in real revenues provided  by  PEMEX, the 
consolidated public sector deficit rose to 17.6 percent of GNP.21 
Not  surprisingly, the Economic Adjustment Program did little to allay the 
fears of the private sector, and the flight out of  peso-denominated assets and 
Mexdollars recommenced on a large scale beginning in mid-March.22  In the 
second quarter alone, capital flight totalled $3.65 billion.23 The government 
staved off another sizable devaluation of the peso by borrowing an additional 
$5.7 billion through three medium-term, syndicated loans. The difficulty in 
arranging the  last  and  largest  loan  ($2.5 billion),  in  which  the  federal 
government was the debtor, underscored the recent,  rapid deterioration in 
Mexico’s creditworthiness: despite being offered very attractive terms, 575 
of  650 banks invited to form the syndicate initially refused to subscribe to 
the loan facility (Zedillo 1985, 316). 
Finally, in August, massive capital flight forced the government’s hand.24 
Additional large price increases were announced for bread and tortillas (100 
percent) and gasoline (50 percent),  and  a dual exchange rate  system was 
established, involving a preferential rate set initially at 50 pesos and a free 
rate.  The  preferential  exchange  rate  was  adjusted  by  a  daily  crawl  and 
applied to  most  merchandise trade  and  foreign debt  payments.  All  other 
transactions (tourism, nonessential imports, capital account items) had to be 
financed through the free market. 
The dual exchange system proved  incapable of  containing capital flight 
and was followed in short order by two desperate measures. On August 13, 
dollar deposits at Mexican commercial banks were converted into pesos at 
an unfavorable exchange rate. Less than three weeks later, on September 1, 
the banking system was nationalized and comprehensive exchange controls 
were imposed. 
None  of  this  brought  Mexico much  closer to  being  able to  service its 
foreign debt. The public sector faced $14.3 billion of payments on principal 
coming due in  1983 and  1984.25 The private sector’s repayment schedule 
was even more onerous. Of $18 billion owed by  the private sector to foreign 
commercial banks, two-thirds was to be repaid by the end of  1984. It was 
soon  conceded  that  Mexico  could  not  adhere  to  the  existing  repayment 
schedule and negotiations began  to  restructure the public  sector’s foreign 
debt.  In the last four months of  the year,  a de fact0 moratorium on debt 
service existed; all payments on the private sector debt ceased, as did most 
payments of principal on the public sector debt. 
Nineteen eighty-two came to a close with Mexico burdened not only by an 
immense foreign debt but also by severe stagflation and a depressed level of 
private investment spending. The strong growth in notional supply that had 
checked inflationary pressures in previous years was reversed as extremely 
restrictive quotas and a series of large real devaluations of the peso forced a 445  MexicoIChapter 4 
36.2 percent reduction in imports of  intermediate inputs. Contraction on the 
supply side coupled with expansionary fiscal policy sent the inflation rate 
soaring to 99 percent while, for the first time since 1932, real output fell. 
The large fiscal deficit led to a large real increase in the domestic component 
of  the monetary base, but expectations that the peso would be devalued and 
the failure to adjust deposit rates in  step with inflation caused a substantial 
decrease in  the volume of  real bank funds (table 4.13). Thus, at the same 
time that real credit to the public sector expanded 44.8 percent, real lending 
to the private sector contracted 23.8 percent. The credit crunch together with 
a 42  percent curtailment of  capital goods imports provoked a 17.3 percent 
decrease  in  real  private  sector  investment  spending.  The  decline  in 
investment spending and the cutback in  imported intermediates (90 percent 
of  which  go  to  the  manufacturing  sector) hit  the  manufacturing  sector 
hardest. After increasing strongly in the first quarter, manufacturing sector 
output and  employment declined by  13.2 and  9.5 percent, respectively, in 
the succeeding three quarters. 
Table 4.13  Monetary Aggregates and Real Interest Rates 
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 





Total stock of bank fundsb 
Total credit of  the financial system' 
Credit to the private sector 





Total stock of bank funds 
Total credit of the financial system 
Credit to the private sector 
Average real hank deposit ratef 
Real effective bank loan rate 
Real interest rates' 
9.8  10.6 
4.6  13.3 
1.5  7.0 
8.9  16.0 
13.2  16.9 
12.0  6.2 
-  20.3 
13.9  14.3 
10.2  10.4 
15.9  15.5 
24.7  26.1 
20.2  21.7 
41.9  42.6 
-  17.6 
-7.8  -1.1 
-  4.3 
12.5  8.7 
11.3  2.7 
13.9  5.6 
12.8  6.6 
13.7  7.8 
9.3  4.5 
12.5  8.8 
14.4  14.3 
10.5  10.1 
15.5  15.2 
26.9  26.4 
22.6  22.4 
41.4  39.7 
19.4  20.0 
-3.6  -9.1 
2.8  3.9 
12.8  -4.3 
3.6  -22.4 
4.5  -10.5 
16.4  -  14.6 
17.1  -15.3 
18.8  14.1 
7.5  -23.8 
15.0  16.1 
9.8  8.8 
15.0  14.9 
27.9  28.2 
23.8  24.0 
42. I  51.9 
20.3  19.3 
-.I  -58.5 
17.3  -26.5 
Sources: The bank deposit rate series is from Mexican Economic Outlook (CIEMEX-WHARTON). All other 
data is from Indicadores Economicos (Bank  of  Mexico). 
Notes:  M2  = Currency held by the public + peso-  and foreign-currency-denominated demand deposits. M3 
= M2  + liquid savings accounts. M4  = M3 + nonliquid (i.e.,  fixed-tern) savings accounts. 
'Real  monetary aggregates are calculated as the end-of-year balance deflated by the end-of-year CPI. 
bM4 less currency held by the public. 
'Credit  of  the Central Bank, the development banks, and the commercial banks. 
dAverage of  the end- and beginning-of-year monetary aggregate relative to GDP. 
'End-of-year  interest rate (December value) less the December-to-December inflation rate. 
weighted average of bank deposit interest rates (CPP, or costo promedio porcenruaf). 446  Edward F.  Buffie 
4.3  Concluding Observations 
The  1982 debt crisis came,  ironically, at the end  of  a period  in  which 
the  Mexican  economy had  been  presented  an  exceptional opportunity  to 
embark upon an era of high and stable growth. During  1977-82,  Mexico 
enjoyed very favorable terms of  trade and was blessed by  the discovery of 
enormous  oil  wealth.26  The  Lopez  Portillo  administration  simply 
squandered  these  windfalls  in  a  sustained  bout  of  extraordinary  fiscal 
indiscipline.  Real  public  expenditures  (net  of  interest  payments  on  the 
external debt)  increased by  115.1 percent  between  1977 and  1982. This 
huge increase in  fiscal spending was  not matched by  a similar buildup of 
the  public  sector revenue base.  Instead,  nonoil revenues were  allowed to 
decline to the point where they largely offset the fiscal surplus yielded by 
PEMEX,  and  the ensuing fiscal deficits were  financed by  taking out ever 
greater  amounts  of  foreign  debt.  When  the  inevitable  reversal  in  net 
foreign lending occurred in  1982, the inconsistencies in policy immediately 
drove the economy into deep stagflation. 
Oil  wealth  and  favorable  external  conditions  provided  such  a  large 
margin  for  error  that,  despite  the  policy  blunders,  Mexico  was  not  in 
serious difficulties until  1981.  At  that  stage,  a  doubling  of  the  gasoline 
tax,  higher  public  sector  prices,  and  modest  restraint  in  the  growth  of 
real  government  expenditure  could  have  lowered  the  fiscal  deficit  to 
2-4  percent  of  GDP  in  a  year  or  two.  Confoundingly,  fiscal  policy 
became not  more restrained,  but  rather  more  reckless.  Political pressures 
reinforced  by  the naive belief  that  future oil sales would  cure all macro- 
economic  imbalances  appear  responsible  for  the  total  collapse  in  fiscal 
control in  1981 and  1982. The political business cycle  called for  strong 
expenditure  increases  in  the  last  two  years;  higher  public  sector  prices 
would  have  hurt  the  middle and  upper-middle classes  disproportionately, 
alienating the  main  political  base  of  the  PRI  (Institutional Revolutionary 
The  overly  rapid  accumulation of  foreign  debt  by  the  Lopez  Portillo 
administration would not have inflicted lasting damage on the economy had 
the funds been used to finance efficient investment projects. Unfortunately, 
this did not happen. According to the various estimates I discussed earlier, 
between 50 percent and 83 percent of the debt financed capital flight. A large 
portion  of  the  remainder  financed  higher  public  sector  consumption and 
investment. It is difficult to believe that the increase in current expenditures 
did much to enhance the economy’s productive capacity, particularly as the 
share of  human-capital-related expenditures  remained  small.  And  though 
little hard data exists on the productivity of state-owned enterprises, there is 
little doubt that many  of  the public  sector investments undertaken in  this 
period were fundamentally unsound and have subsequently yielded very low 
social returns. 
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After making due allowance for capital flight, the splurge in government 
consumption,  and  inefficient  investments  by  the  parastatal  sector,  it  is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that Mexico obtained remarkably little for 
the $59.7 billion of foreign loans taken out during the Lopez Portillo years. 
Perhaps the best evidence in support of  this conclusion is provided by  the 
extreme hardship the economy has  subsequently suffered in  servicing the 
debt. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
5  The De La Madrid 
Administration and 
the Present Crisis 
The  De  La  Madrid  administration  began  with  a  two-year  respite  from 
large-scale debt service payments. On 10 December 1982, an agreement was 
reached  with  the  commercial  banks  to  reschedule  $23  billion  of  capital 
payments on the public sector debt coming due between 23 August 1982 and 
31 December 1984. The maturity of the debt was extended to eight years and 
allowed  for  a  four-year  grace  period.  The  price  for  lengthening  the 
repayment period was a  1 percent restructuring fee and  an increase in the 
interest rate of  approximately one percentage point. Whereas the previously 
contracted debt involved spreads of 0.83 and 0.66 percentage points over the 
U.S.  prime rate and LIBOR, respectively, the restructured debt gave lenders 
the  option of  a rate  1.75 percentage points over the prime rate  or  1.875 
percentage  points  over  LIBOR.  The  new  (public  sector)  debt  service 
schedule involved  minimal  amortization  until  the  end  of  1984 and  then 
called for $61.4 billion of capital payments from 1985 to 1990. 
The debt restructuring at the end of  1982 was followed in  1983 by  two 
additional,  smaller  reschedulings.  Private  firms  able  to  convert  their 
short-term  debt  into  long-term  debt  according  to  government  guidelines 
became  eligible  for  a  program  of  insurance  against  exchange  rate  risk 
(covering both  principal and  interest) offered by  FICORCA  (see sec.  8.3 
below  for a detailed description of  the program).  By  the end of  October, 
some $12 billion of private sector liabilities were tentatively covered by the 
FICORCA facility; almost all of this debt was renegotiated to mature at eight 
or more years and  included  a four-year grace period.  Earlier, in June,  $2 
billion in export credits had also been rescheduled. 
These reschedulings were supplemented by $5 billion in new loans to the 
public sector: The new loans carried even harder terms than the restructured 